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In an overlapping generations economy setup we show that, if individuals can improve their life 
expectancy by exerting some effort, costly in terms of either resources or utility, the competitive 
equilibrium steady state differs from the ﬁrst best steady state. This is due to the fact that under 
perfect competition individuals fail to anticipate the impact of their longevity-enhancing effort on 
the return of their annuitized savings. We identify the policy instruments required to implement 
the ﬁrst-best into a competitive equilibrium and show that they are speciﬁc to the form, whether 
utility or resources, that the effort takes. 
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In the last century, an unprecedented rise in life expectancy has been a pervasive
phenomenon in both developed and developing countries. This has surely been
due mostly to a host of causes aecting whole societies at large like, for instance,
progress in medicine, improvements in agriculture, and better sanitary conditions,
among others. Although there may also be among these causes a component that is
related to individual behaviors or choices, its contribution to this dramatic increase
in life expectancy is likely to have been small compared to those mentioned above.
Nevertheless, an immediate consequence, among many others, of the increase in life
expectancy is the pressure it puts on, for instance, the provision of health care, on
pay-as-you-go pensions systems, on housing, etc.1 Thus, as the constraints on these
and other resources become tighter, the relative importance of the individual-specic
causes of the increase in life expectancy may increase as well, and the question then
arises about whether the decentralized choices made by the individuals about their
eorts to have an ever increasing life expectancy are the right ones from an eciency
viewpoint.
Individuals can privately inuence their life expectancy in various ways choosing to
undertake actions and behaviors that tend to increase it, or to avoid those that may
decrease it. Nevertheless, these choices typically imply a cost for them, either in
terms of a disutility incurred or in terms of additional spending in, say, healthcare,
and hence of forgone consumption. In eect, while the most obvious way to in-
crease life expectancy is to increase medical treatment |which requires the actual
spending of income| individuals can also make behavioral choices to that end (e.g.
exercising, abstaining from smoking, eating a healthy diet, driving safely) that do
not necessarily require an additional spending, but may inict nonetheless some
disutility on the individual.2
Despite the undisputable positive aspect of having a higher longevity, this overall
increase has had also some detrimental external eects on, for example, pension
systems, publicly provided healthcare, urban development, and the environment.
1Of course, a longer life, specically a healthier one, increases also the labor force available for
production at any time, which works in the opposite direction, but for the sake of simplicity we
are going to make abstraction of this fact.
2On the impact of health expenditures on life expectancy, see Poikolainen (1986). Several studies
have also shown the impact of factors such as physical activity (Kaplan et al.,1987 and Okamoto,
2006), overweight (see Solomon and Manson, 1997 and Bender et al. 1998) and smoking (Doll and
Hill, 1950).
2The specic point this paper addresses is that, besides these well-known detrimen-
tal external eects, there exists another negative externality due to a higher life
expectancy simply related to the impact that the individual's choice of quantity of
life has on his quality of life, through the private resources he is left with for his
extended life, if savings are annuitized. Becker and Philipson (1998) emphasized
already how a rise in the quantity of life can aect its quality by showing that indi-
viduals investing in their longevity do not take into account that, by doing so, they
inuence the return of their annuitized savings. The result is too much investment
in longevity compared to what would be optimal. Becker and Philipson (1998) thus
suggests that one way to ensure a high return of savings should be to tax health
expenditures (and thus, implicitly longevity). Some papers give recommendations
in this direction. For example, Leroux (2008) showed that in the case of non-
contractible eort to increase longevity, the social planner should tax second-period
consumptions in order to reduce incentives for the individual to invest in longevity.
Leroux et al. (2008a,b) studied the taxation of longevity-enhancing health expen-
ditures and showed that three factors play a role in the choice of the adequate tax
rate: (i) the possible misperception by the agents of their true survival probability;
(ii) the Becker-Philipson eect, as described above; and, in case of asymmetric in-
formation, (iii) incentive constraints. Nevertheless, in Leroux (2008) and Leroux et
al. (2008a,b) the framework was essentially static, with a 2-period-lived agent that
solves a one-shot problem at the begining of the rst period.
In this paper, on the contrary, we study the problem in a truly dynamic general
equilibrium framework. Adressing the issue in a dynamic setup is the natural next
step to undertake, since similar instances of ineciencies due to an overlooked (by
competitive agents) impact of individual saving decisions on the saving returns arise
naturally in overlapping generations models as well (see D avila (2008)). Thus we
consider an overlapping generations economy in which individuals are identical ex-
cept for the date they are born in. The representative agent is sure to live at least
one period and at most two, conditional on a survival probability. He supplies in-
elastically labor when young and consumes from his labor income when young, and
from his annuitized capital and monetary savings when old (if alive). We assume
that the representative agent can inuence his survival probability exerting some
eort. We will distinguish between the case in which this eort entails a direct
disutility but no additional spending (the disutility-eort case), and the case in
which it requires some additional spending but has no direct impact on the agent's
utility (the expenditure-eort case).3 Thus, an expenditure-eort can be thought of
3We could as well assume that the individual exerts the two dierent types of eorts at the same
time, but for the sake of simplicity, we consider them separately.
3simply as health expenditures that enters the individual budget constraint and as
resources unavailable for consumption or saving. A disutility-eort implies instead
a cost in terms of utility only, entering negatively the utility function but not the
budget constraint. It can be thought of generally as leading a "healthy" way of life
(exercising, eating healthily, abstaining from smoking and other instantly grati-
cating pleasures, etc.), that might be unappealing to the individual at the time he
exerts the eort, but that improves also his or her life expectancy and hence the
prospects of enjoying utility from consumption in the second period of life.
Under the setup dened above, we show that, both in the disutility-eort and the
expenditure-eort cases, the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state level
of individual eort is higher than the rst-best steady state, and hence inecient.
For instance, in the expenditure-eort case the individuals do not take into account,
as in Becker and Philipson (1998), that by investing in their longevity they also
decrease the return of their annuitized savings |very much as in they do in D avila
(2008) by saving too much capital| and in that way they reduce their consumption
possibilities in the second period. A similar eect is observed in the disutility-eort
case. As a consequence, there is, as in the static case, room for a public intervention
aiming at making the competitive equilibrium steady state with an annuity market
for savings coincide with the rst-best steady state. However, in the dynamic setup
the policy instruments needed are dierent from those needed in the static case, and
dier as well depending on whether the eort takes the form of a disutility or of
an expenditure. In the disutility-eort case, we show to be optimal to announce a
second-period lump-sum tax that depends on the second-period consumption of the
previous generation and on the rate of growth of the population (net of the mortality
rate between periods). Interestingly enough, at the competitive equilibrium steady
state, the amount actually raised by the tax is zero in every period, so that the
implementation of the rst-best steady state allocation is achieved by the mere
announcement of the policy. If, on the contrary, the eort is an actual expenditure
(e.g. health expenditure), it simply requires to tax that expenditure at the young
age and to make a lump-sum transfer of the same amount to the contemporary
old. At the steady state, redistribution actually takes place, whenever there is
demographic growth.
Our paper can be related to the growing literature dealing with endogenous longevity
in overlapping generations setups. Some papers have already emphasized the role
of endogenous longevity in shaping growth and savings patterns (see, for exam-
ple, Chakraborty, 2004) as well as the environment (Jouvet et al., 2007). Other
papers have studied how the golden rule is modied by the introduction of endoge-
4nous longevity, inducing the under-accumulation of capital when longevity depends
on public health expenditures (De la Croix and Ponthi ere, 2008). These papers
dier however from ours in several respects. First, all of them consider health ex-
penditures as a publicly-provided good, so that individuals have no direct control
over their life expectancy. Second, they consider, for a given public policy, either
the competitive equilibrium steady state when the consumption-saving choice has
longevity consequences, as in Chakraborty (2004) or the rst-best steady state (as
in De la Croix and Ponthi ere, 2008), but none of them shows that the laissez-faire
competitive equilibrium steady state with annuitized savings typically diers from
the rst-best steady state. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, no paper
has yet established that the combination of private health expenditures and of an
annuity market requires an active scal policy if the rst-best steady state is to
be implemented as a competitive equilibrium. Moreover, we identify the dierent
policies required for the implementation of the rst-best depending on the specic
form that the life expectancy-increasing eort can take.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 shows for the disutility-eort case that the competitive equilibrium steady
state typically diers from the rst-best steady state, and shows how to restore the
rst-best. Section 4, does the same but for the expenditure-eort case. Section 5
concludes.
2. The model
Time is discrete, and at every date t, a generation of identical agents is born. The
size of the generations increases in time at a rate n. Agents live at least one period
and at most two, conditional to a survival with probability (et) that they can
inuence by the choice of some eort level et. A period-t agent supplies inelastically
when young his labor (normalized to 1) for a real wage rate wt that he can split
as he wishes between rst period consumption ct
0 and saving, which he can hold in
either capital or intrinsically worthless money. His capital savings kt earn a return
rt+1at t + 1, while monetary holdings Mt bought at a real price 1
pt at t are worth
1
pt+1Mt at t + 1. Savings (augmented of their return) are used for second period
consumption ct
1. Note that the probability of survival (et) represents also the
proportion of individuals born at t who survive to the next period. Finally, eort
can be costly to agents either in terms of utility (Section 3) or in terms of forgone
income for consumption (Section 4). The rst case tries to capture the inuence
on life expectancy of individual behavioral choices that are unrelated to income
5but undesirable per se, while the second case can be simply thought of as standard
health expenditures.
Consider rst the utility-eort case. The probability of survival (et) depends on
an eort level et |with 0(et) > 0 and 00(et) < 0| that creates a linear disutility4
et ( represents thus the intensity of the eort disutility, assumed to be identical
across individuals).5 The utility from consumption when young and old is given by
the dierentiably increasing and concave functions u(c) and v(c) respectively with
limc0!0 u0(c0) = +1 = limc1!0 v0(c1). The lifetime utility of the representative





1)   et: (1)
Since eort has no impact at all on the agent's income, his budget constraints at
periods t and t + 1 are respectively
ct










Consider now the income-eort case. We assume that the individual spends an
amount et of his income in health care, which inuences his survival probability,
equal to (et) (as before 0(et) > 0 and 00(et) < 0). In this case, in the utility






but the agent bears a cost in terms of resources, et which reduces the rst-period
income available for consumption and saving:
ct
0 + kt +
1
pt
Mt + et = wt
ct





4Note that we obtain the same results by assuming convex disutility of eort. For simplicity of
exposure, we stick to the linear case.
5For the case where the eort disutility diers across individuals in a static setup, see Leroux
(2008).
6Note that, as opposed to other endogenous longevity models (e.g. Chakraborty
(2004) and De la Croix and Ponthiere (2008)), in the two cases above the level of
eort et is chosen by the individual himself.
Production is standard: at every period, rms produce, out of capital and labor, a
single good that can be either consumed (possibly as health expenditure) or saved
to be used as capital for production the next period. The production function
F(K;L) exhibits constant returns to scale and good and factors markets are per-
fectly competitive, so that the wage rate equals the marginal productivity of labor













given that, at every period t, aggregate capital Kt equals at equilibrium the previous
period aggregate savings in terms of capital (1+n)t 1kt 1 (for the sake of simplicity
capital is assumed to depreciate completely in one period), and aggregate labour
Lt equals (1 + n)t. Note that, according to the equations above, capital savings
are assumed to be invested into a fund that lends to rms and gets therefore the
marginal productivity of capital. Since the return to capital savings is annuitized,
it depends on the survival probability (et), and hence on eort et. Indeed, the
return to the aggregate savings invested in the fund is augmented by the fact that
a proportion 1 (et) individuals of each generation does not survive and therefore
prots are to be distributed among the proportion (et) of survivors only. This is
a crucial feature of our model.
3. Case in which increasing life
expectancy is costly in terms of utility
In this section, we assume that the longevity-enhancing eort has a cost in terms
of utility only, such as eating a healthy diet, not smoking, exercising, etc.
3.1 First-best steady state.
Firstly, we characterize the rst-best steady state, i.e. the steady state that maxi-
7mizes the utility of the representative agent solving the problem
max
c0;c1;k;e









where k is the steady state per capita savings in terms of capital. The constraint in
the optimization problem above is the resource constraint requiring that the output
per worker allows at any time to satisfy the consumption of the young and old agents
alive that period, the latter being only a proportion 1
1+n of the former (of which,
moreover, only a fraction (e) would have survived) because of the population



























for some  6= 0, given the monotonicity of u, along with the resource constraint in
the optimization problem above. Equivalently, the rst-best steady state is a prole
c
0;c
1;e;k satisfying the equations:
u0(c0)
v0(c1)

















(e)v0(c1)) between rst and second period consumptions to the rate at which
resources can be transferred from the rst to the second period of life (namely 1+n
(e));
it determines thus the optimal level of savings. The second equation in the rst line,
on the other hand, pins down the optimal level of individual capital savings. The
second line is the feasibility constraint, while the last line determines the optimal
level of eort. This last condition is specic to the endogenous life expectancy setup
we are considering, and it states that the optimal level of eort should be such that
the marginal cost of eort (the right-hand side) should equate its marginal benet
(the left-hand side). While the marginal benet is simply given by the marginal
increase of the survival probability times the utility of second period consumption,
8the marginal cost of increasing survival consists of the sum of a direct marginal
utility cost of increasing eort (namely ) and an indirect cost in terms of the addi-
tional pressure on resources (i.e. 

0(e)
1+n c1 = 0(e)v0(c1)c1 from the second rst-order
condition in (7)). This latter eect follows from the fact that an increase in every-
one's survival chances creates an additional demand for the existing resources. As it
will be seen in the next section, this additional cost of an increased life expectancy
is not taken into account by the individuals when choosing their eort level in a
competitive equilibrium under laissez-faire.
3.2 Laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state with money.
We turn now to characterizing the competitive equilibrium steady state allocation
under laissez-faire. The representative agent's problem amounts (i) to choose how
much to save and how to allocate his savings between capital and money, and (ii)
to choose how much eort to make to increase the chances of surviving into the

























































































9At the competitive equilibrium, the two conditions in (5) equating at every period,
the wage rate to the marginal productivity of labor and the rental rate of capital
to its annuitized marginal productivity, must be satised as well. Thus at any time


























where (because of the feasibility of the allocation of resources and the constant
returns to scale of the technology) the rst three terms of the left-hand side cancel







Thus, at equilibrium, the individual monetary holdings must always decrease at a
slower pace than in the standard 2-period lifetime case with certainty (where they
decrease every period by a constant factor 1
1+n). This accounts for the fact that
some individuals die in the end of the rst period.
At a competitive equilibrium steady state the monetary savings held by the agents




pt+1 always, and therefore prices must







where e is the steady state individual level of eort. Therefore, the competitive























10These equations would be equivalent to those characterizing the rst-best steady
state6 if it were not for the term 0(e)v0(c1)c1 appearing in the last equation on the
rst-best conditions (8), but missing in the competitive equilibrium steady state
conditions (15). As a consequence, the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady
state is not the rst-best steady state, as the next proposition establishes.
Proposition 1. In the standard Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy
with production and money, the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state
is inecient when the agents can choose the disutility they are willing to incur in
order to increase their life expectancy.
Proof. Let (c
0;c
1;k;e) be the rst-best steady state solution to (8), and ( c0; c1;
 k;  m;  e) be the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state solution to (15).
It follows trivially from the last equation in each of the systems (8) and (15) that,
should the two steady states coincide, then since




it would hold also
0(e)v0(c
1)c
1 = 0 (17)
which cannot hold for an interior steady state guaranteed by the good behavior at
the boundary of the representative agent's utility. Q.E.D.
As noted above, the term 0(e)v0(c1)c1 (which from the rst-best rst order condi-
tions (8) is equivalent to 

0(e)
1+n c1) measures the indirect cost of an increase in life
expectancy implied by the additional pressure put on resources by a bigger fraction
of survivors. This cost is not taken into account by the individuals in a competitive
equilibrium. In eect, price-taking individuals disregard the impact of their eort
|through a higher life expectancy| on the return to their own savings. More
specically, they take as given the return to capital rt+1 while it happens to be at
equilibrium a function FK( k
t
1+n;l)=(et) of their own eort et. The same remark
holds for the return to his monetary savings which, with perfect foresight, he takes
as given to be pt=pt+1, while it turns out to depend at equilibrium on his eort,
according to (1+n)=(et). As a consequence, the agents overinvest in their life ex-
pectancy with respect to the ecient level, living in expectation longer lives while
saving in terms of capital the same amount, which leads them to enjoy lower levels
of consumption in both periods, as the following proposition shows.
6To be more precise they would rather imply the rst-best conditions, but under conditions guar-
anteeing the uniqueness of a rst-best steady state that amounts to the same thing.
11Proposition 2. In the standard Diamond (1965) overlapping generations econ-
omy with production and money, if the agents can choose the disutility to incur
in order to increase their life expectancy, then at the laissez-faire competitive equi-
librium steady state prole of consumptions, savings, and life-expectancy eort
( c0; c1; k;  m;  e) satisfying (15), the agents' rst and second period consumptions are
lower and the eort devoted to increase their life expectancy  e bigger than at the
rst-best prole (c
0;c
1;k;e) satisfying (8), i.e.
c
1 >  c1
c
0 >  c0
k =  k
e <  e:
(18)
Proof. Firstly,  k = k follows trivially from the equalization of the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital to the rate of growth of the population in both the laissez-faire
competitive equilibrium steady state and the rst-best steady state.
As for the level of eort e, let us see rst that necessarily e   e.
(1) Assume e >  e, and assume also that c


















;1)   k = F(
 k
1 + n






0) > u0( c0): (21)
Moreover, since c





















12which cannot be since both at the competitive equilibrium steady state and
the rst-best steady state these marginal rates of substitution are equal to
the rate of growth of the population 1 + n.
(2) Assume otherwise that e >  e and c
1 <  c1. Then 0(e) < 0( e) since  is
concave, and v(c
1) < v( c1), so that
0(e)v(c
1) < 0( e)v( c1) (24)




1 < 0 (25)
which cannot be either.
Therefore, necessarily e   e.
Let us see now that e <  e indeed.
(1) Assume that e =  e and that c









0 < (>) c0 by (20), from which
u0(c
0) > (<)u0( c0): (27)
Moreover, since c





















which again cannot be since both at the competitive equilibrium steady
state and the rst best steady state these marginal rates of substitution are
equal to the growth factor of the population 1 + n.7
(2) Assume that e =  e and assume moreover that c









0 =  c0, i.e. (c
0;c
1;e) = ( c0; c1;  e) which cannot be by Proposi-
tion 1.
7Note that although admittedly repetitive, the argument cannot be collapsed into a single step.
13Therefore, necessarily e <  e.
Finally, assume c









0 >  c0 by (20), from which
u0(c
0) < u0( c0): (32)
Moreover, since c





















which cannot be since both at the competitive equilibrium steady state and the
rst best steady state these marginal rates of substitution are equal to the growth
factor of the population 1 + n.8
Therefore, necessarily c
1 >  c1.
As a consquence, since both at the rst-best steady state and the laissez-faire com-










1 >  c1 implies c
0 >  c0 as well.
Q.E.D.
In the following section, we show how to decentralize the rst-best steady state as
a competitive equilibrium.
8The same remark as in footnote 6 applies here.
143.3 Implementation of the First-Best Steady State as a competitive equi-
librium steady state.
Note that many instances of unhealthy behaviors with a direct link with life ex-
pectancy that do not have an impact on the agent's budget constraints (like not
exercising or taking prolonged sunbaths) go, for that same reason, untaxed.9 More-
over, in many cases, it is not possible to tax them indirectly either, by taxing, for
example, saving returns (held in terms of either capital or money). In eect, on the
one hand, taxing savings may disincentive the prospect of a high life expectancy
and, thus, it could discourage a healthy behavior. But, on the other hand, taxing
savings distorts the consumption-saving decision, modifying the condition equating
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of consumption to the return to sav-
ings in (15), which would make it impossible to coincide with the rst-best steady
state.10
Therefore, consider instead the following policy. Announce at each period t to






(et 1) will be raised/transferred. Note that although (et), the
survival rate of generation t, is not known at the time t of the announcement
(everything else is), it will crucially be nonetheless known at the time the policy
will have to be implemented in t+1. As a matter of fact, the individuals are given
the opportunity |by their knowledge of the exact form the lump-sum tax/subsidy
will take| to manipulate the tax or subsidy. As a consequence, they will change
their behavior. Interestingly enough, it turns out that, since they modied their
behavior, it is actually them who are being manipulated by the policy maker in
order to implement the rst-best steady state.
In eect, the representative agent's problem becomes now (with the second period
9Others (like smoking and drinking alcohol) do. And others still that could be taxed (like eating
junk food) are not, yet. Nevertheless, harmful behaviors, to one-self or to others, are taxed indeed,
through nes (e.g. for speeding and other instances of dangerous driving).
10For instance, in Leroux (2008), it is shown that, in a static partial equilibrium framework, the
rst-best allocation can be restored through a tax on savings or, equivalently, on second period
consumption. In this case, the individual has less incentives to invest in a higher life expectancy















































































along with the budget constraints of the optimization problem above or, equiva-





























As before, at equilibrium the two conditions (5) determining the wage and rental
rates are still satised. As for the feasibility condition, adding up the budget con-




































16Note again that (because of the feasibility and constant returns to scale) the rst
three terms of the left-hand side cancel out with the rst two of the right-handside,
























as the last term in (40) vanishes. Therefore, the competitive equilibrium steady
state is now a prole  c0; c1;  e; k;  m satisfying
u0(c0)
v0(c1)


















0(e)v(c1) =  + 0(e)v0(c1)c1:
(42)
The solution to this system coincides with the solution to equations (8) above.11





(et 1) is zero at the steady state, so that no tax
or subsidy is actually raised or handed out in that case, keeping the government
budget trivially balanced. As a matter of fact, the mere announcement of the policy
makes the agents modify their choices in such a way that the rst-best steady state
is attained in a decentralized way when this was not possible under laissez-faire.
This result is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. In the standard Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy
with production and money, if the agents can choose the disutility to incur in order
to increase their life expectancy, the rst-best prole (c
0;c
1;k;e) satisfying (8) is
11To be precise, every solution to this system is also a solution to equations (8). Therefore, under
conditions guaranteeing the uniqueness of the rst-best steady state, the two systems of equations
are equivalent.






(et 1) is raised (transferred) from (to) each generation t.
This policy restores the rst-best steady state for two reasons. First, adjusting their
eort, the individuals directly reduce the tax they face (or increase the subsidy they
receive) when old and, second, they adjust their probability of survival according
to the prospect of facing a tax which reduces their future consumption or a subsidy
that increases it. By imposing a lump-sum subsidy or tax on consumption when
old, the planner makes more or less attractive the prospect of survival and thus
provides incentives to the individual to choose the right level of eort.
4. Case in which increasing life
expectancy is costly in terms of resources
Assume now that the individual can increase his life expectancy at some cost in
terms of resources, so that the individual can divert part of his rst period income
away from consumption and saving, in order to increase his chances of survival.
Thus, this eort appears directly in the individual's rst period budget constraint
instead of directly in the individual's utility. As in the previous case, we will charac-
terize rst the rst-best steady state, then the competitive equilibrium steady state
under laissez-faire, and nally the policy that implements the rst-best steady state
as a competitive equilibrium outcome.
4.1 First-best steady state.












where e denotes the resources devoted to increase the individuals' life expectancy
(through their probability of survival) as, say, health expenditures, and that enters
directly the feasibility constraint. The solution to the optimization problem above





























along with the constraint of the problem above. Equivalently, a rst-best steady
















0(e)v(c1) = (1 + n)v0(c1) + 0(e)v0(c1)c1:
(45)
Note that the rst line is the same condition as the one obtained in the case where in-
creasing life expectancy is costly in terms of utility in (8): rst, the equality between
the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution and the rate at which consumption
can be transferred between the two periods, and second, the maximization of out-
put net of capital replacement. The feasibility condition in the second line includes
now as an expenditure the resources e devoted to pin down the life expectancy of
the individual, i.e. health expenditures. Thus output net of replacement of used
up capital must be at any period equal to the consumption of young individuals,
plus the consumption of the survivors of the preceding generation, and the health
expenditures.
Finally, the last condition diers from the one obtained in the utility-eort case in
(8). Indeed, the term (1+n)v0(c1) is now substituted to the term  in the right-hand
side. As before, this condition still requires that, at the rst-best steady state, the
marginal benet of increasing the life expectancy, 0(e)v(c1), exactly matches its
marginal cost which, in this case, consists of (i) the direct impact that an increase
in health expenditures has on second period consumption |reducing it at a rate
1+n
(e) and hence reducing second period utility at a rate (1 + n)v0(c1) (rst term
on the right-hand side)| and of (ii) the indirect cost (common to both the utility-
eort and the resources-eort cases) in terms of the additional pressure on resources
following from bigger cohorts of survivors (the second term 

0(e)
1+n c1 = 0(e)v0(c1)c1
in the right-hand side).
194.2 Competitive equilibrium steady state under laissez-faire.
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As in the utility-eort case, the individual has to decide how much to save as well
as the composition of his savings portfolio in terms of capital and money. The
dierence now comes from the fact that, he must decide as well how much of his
income to devote to health expenditures et in order to pin down the optimal (from
his viewpoint) life expectancy. The solution to the agent's problem is characterized
















































along with the budget constraints in the problem above. Equivalently, agent t's
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At the competitive equilibrium, the wage and rental rate are still determined by the
conditions (5) determining the wage and rental rate of capital, so that the return
to savings invested in capital by a generation depends on the survival rate of that
same generation. Under competitive conditions, the individuals take these variables
20as given. Again, from the addition of the budget constraints of the agents alive at
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Therefore, a competitive equilibrium steady state under laissez-faire consists of a
prole  c0; c1;  e; k;  m such that
u0(c0)
v0(c1)


















0(e)v(c1) = (1 + n)v0(c1):
(52)
Only the last equation in the system above diers from the one in the rst-best
system of equations in (45). Indeed, compared to the rst-best system (45), the
term 0(e)v0(c1)c1 is missing in (52), which is simply due to the fact that the return
to savings invested in capital, rt+1 = 1
(et)FK( k
t
1+n;l) and in money, pt=pt+1 =
(1 + n)=(et), are taken as given by the individual under perfect competition. He
does not take into account that, by investing in his longevity, he is also going to
modify the overall return of his savings and thus, his consumption possibilities when
old. As a consequence, the suboptimality of the competitive equilibrium steady state
follows, as the following proposition establishes.
21Proposition 4. In the standard Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy
with production and money, the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state




1;k;e) be the rst-best steady state solution to (45), and
( c0; c1; k;  m;  e) be the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state solution to
(52), it follows trivially from the last equation in each of the systems (45) and (52)
that should the two coincide, then since





it would hold also
0(e)v0(c
1)c
1 = 0 (54)
which cannot hold for an interior steady state guaranteed by the good behavior at
the boundary of the agent's utility. Q.E.D.
As in the previous utility-eort case, the fact that the individuals do not take into
account the stress that a higher life expectancy puts on the available resources leads
them to invest too much resources into it compared to what would be the optimal
amount, i.e.  e > e. The next proposition establishes this.
Proposition 5. In the standard Diamond (1965) overlapping generations econ-
omy with production and money, if the agents can choose the resources to in-
vest into increasing their life expectancy, then at the laissez-faire competitive equi-
librium steady state prole of consumptions, savings, and life-expectancy eort
( c0; c1; k;  m;  e) satisfying (52), the agent's second-period consumption is not bigger
and the resources invested into increasing his life expectancy  e are not smaller than
at the rst-best prole (c
0;c
1;k;e) satisfying (45), while his capital savings are
the same, i.e.
c
1   c1
k =  k
e   e
(55)
Proof. 12 Firstly,  k = k follows trivially from the equalization of the marginal
productivity of capital to the rate of growth of the population in both the laissez-
faire competitive equilibrium steady state and the rst-best steady state.
12The proof parallels that of the utility-eort case, but maybe surprisingly has a few twists that
22As for the level of eort e and the second -period consumption c1, let us see rst
that necessarily e   e and c
1   c1.
(1) Assume e >  e and c




1 + e >
( e)
1 + n
 c1 +  e (56)
and hence c






1 + e = F(
k
1 + n
;1)   k = F(
 k
1 + n
;1)    k =  c0 +
( e)
1 + n
 c1 +  e (57)
so that
u0(c
0) > u0( c0): (58)
Moreover, since c





















which cannot be since both at the competitive equilibrium steady state and
the rst best steady state these marginal rates of substitution are equal to
the growth factor of the population 1 + n.
As a consequence, either e   e, or c
1 <  c1, or both hold.
(2) Assume that both e   e and c




1 + e <
( e)
1 + n
 c1 +  e (61)
and hence c
0 >  c0 by (57), from which
u0(c
0) < u0( c0): (62)
make it signicantly dierent. Notably, a consequence of them is that no relation can be established
between the rst period consumptions  c0 and c
0, as well as that neither c
1 >  c1 nor e <  e are
guaranteed anymore.
23Moreover, since c





















which cannot be since both at the competitive equilibrium steady state and
the rst best steady state these marginal rates of substitution are equal to
the growth factor of the population 1 + n.
Therefore, either e   e and c
1   c1, or e >  e and c
1 <  c1.
(3) Assume e >  e and c
1 <  c1. Then v0(c
1) > v0( c1) holds, as well as 0(e) <
0( e) and v(c
1) < v( c1), and hence
0(e)v(c
1) < 0( e)v( c1) (65)
But since,
0(e)v(c








1 < 0, which cannot be.
Therefore e   e and c
1   c1.
Q.E.D.
It is worth noting that, as opposed to what happened in the disutility-eort case,
nothing can be said now about how do the rst-period consumptions c
0 and  c0
compare. This is simply due to the fact that when e enters the budget constraint, it
gives one additional degree of freedom to the problem, which leaves undetermined
how c
0 and  c0 compare.
4.3 FBSS implementation as a competitive equilibrium steady state with
money and taxes.
Contrarily to what happened in the utility-eort case, health expenditures can be
taxed or subsidized directly. This simplies considerably the implementation of
24the rst-best steady state. For instance, assume that the government taxes health
expenditures at a rate t and hands at t+1 a lump-sum transfer Tt to agents born
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At a competitive equilibrium, the conditions (5) determining the wage and rental
rate of capital still hold. We require also that the government runs a balanced




where the amount raised by taxes on health expenditures on the left-hand side
matches at every period the amount handed out to the survivors of the previous
generation, on the right-hand side. Finally, adding up the budget constraints of the
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Therefore, the competitive equilibrium steady state is characterized now by a prole
 c0; c1;  e; k;  m satisfying
u0(c0)
v0(c1)
























Comparing conditions (74) with those characterizing the rst-best steady state in






Therefore, in order to implement the rst-best steady state, the government just
needs to announce at the beginning of each period t that (i) health expenditures












Note, that if v(:) has constant elasticity of substitution, v(x) = x, this tax takes the form "=(1 ")
and depends thus only on the parameter  and not on the particular value of the steady state second
period consumption c1.
26(which depends only on known variables and cannot be manipulated by individuals
born in period t) and (ii) a lump-sum transfer will be made to period-t agents at
t + 1 of an amount equal to14








The lump-sum transfer depends thus on the elasticity of the survival probabil-
ity with respect to health expenditures and on the consumption when old of the
previous generation. Replacing these two expressions into conditions in (74) char-
acterizing the competitive equilibrium steady state with taxes, it is straightforward
to check that at the steady state the conditions coincide with those of the rst-
best steady state in (45),15 so that such tax-and-transfers scheme implements the
rst-best steady state. This result is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 6. In the standard Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy
with production and money, if the agents can choose the resources to invest into
increasing their life expectancy, the rst-best prole (c
0;c
1;k;e) satisfying (45) is







for each generation t, and a second period lump-sum transfer is made to each







Finally, consider the expected per capita net taxes paid by any given generation t,
i.e. t = tet  (et)Tt (note that the transfer Tt is conditional on the individual's
survival, while the contribution is paid in rst period, with certainty). Replacing










14Note that the formulation of the transfer Tt is dened such that it depends only on variables
which cannot be manipulated by the individuals born in period t. The consequence of such an
assumption is that the budget balance condition, although satised at the steady state, will not
be satised ex post, outside the steady state.
15Under assumtions guaranteeing the uniqueness of the latter.




  1] < 0: (81)
These expected net taxes are negative simply because of our assumption of pos-
itive demographic growth as (if n = 0, we would also have  = 0). This is not
incompatible with budget balance at each period, which is guaranteed by (70).
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we address in a dynamic setup the externality created by expenses or
individual behaviors that have an impact on the individual's life expectancy. Becker
and Philipson (1998) rst showed in a static setup how the individuals' attempts to
increase the "quantity" of their life also aect the "quality" of it in a way that they
do not perfectly anticipate, which typically leads to an inecient outcome. More
specically, we show, in this paper, that in an overlapping generations economy
with production  a la Diamond (1965) the competitive equilibrium steady state still
diers from the rst-best steady state because of this external eect of longevity
on the return to savings, both when individuals can aect their life expectancy
by means of health expenditures, or when they can do it by just improving their
habits in a way that is costly for them in terms of utility (but at no cost in terms
of resources). The externality is created by the fact that individuals do not take
into account that their life expectancy aects the return to their annuitized savings
(held either in money or in capital) and, hence, their consumption possibilities
when old. In this case, they are likely to invest too much in their longevity in
comparison to what would be optimal. We show nonetheless that the rst-best
steady state can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium in both cases if the
government announces and implements the adequate policy of taxes and transfers,
and we identify this policies.
Still our paper could be extended in several ways. First, we consider a type of eort
which is costly in terms of utility and in terms of resources but we excluded the case
where the eort requires time investment. This would certainly have implications
on the labour supply. Moreover, we assume a perfect annuity market, which may
be far from what is observed in reality; in a extension of this paper, we should relax
this assumption. This is on our research agenda.
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